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Legal scholarship, following rational-choice theory, has tradition-
ally treated uncertainty as a single category. A large body of
experimental studies, however, has established that individuals treat
guesses concerning the future differently than guesses concerning
the past. Even where objective probabilities and payoffs are identi-
cal, individuals are much more willing to predict a future event
(and are more confident in the accuracy of their predictions) than
they are willing to postdict a past event (and are also less confident
in the accuracy of their postdiction). For example, individuals are
more willing to bet on the results of a future die toss than they are
willing to bet on the results of a past toss.
After presenting the robust psychological and experimental-
economic literature, this Article demonstrates the relevance of the
behavioral differences concerning past and future uncertainties to
legal policy. It shows that the prediction-postdiction findings are
important for the design of legal norms, the choice among compet-
ing law-enforcement strategies, and the application of various
sentencing practices. This Article shows that the making of legal
norms, the detection of violators, and the infliction of sanctions
may generate different types of uncertainty involving predictions
and postdictions that policymakers can exploit to provide optimal
incentives.
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INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty is prevalent in legal contexts. Parties to a contract often face
uncertainty regarding the value of the goods they buy, criminals often face
uncertainty with respect to the probability of detection, and potential tort-
feasors often face uncertainty regarding the possibility that their behavior
will inflict harm. Uncertainty in such cases can be placed in the future as
well as in the past. For example, when purchasing a used car, the buyer
could be uncertain of the date the manufacturer will terminate the produc-
tion of this model (future) or the maintenance history of the vehicle (past).
In the context of law enforcement, a burglar might be uncertain of the likeli-
hood that the owners will return early (future) or whether a hidden camera
has been installed in the house (past). In torts, a doctor can be uncertain if
his patient will use (future) or has used (past) drugs that prevent the pre-
scription of possible medication. In the legal context, therefore, individuals
are often required to predict the future as well as to "postdict" the past.
Legal scholarship, following rational-choice theory, has traditionally
treated uncertainty as a single category in which decisions are governed by the
pertinent probabilities and payoffs.' Under this approach-since the actual
1. See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compli-
ance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (showing how uncertainty may influence
parties' incentives to invest in harm prevention); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence
and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 279 (1986) (exploring the effects of uncer-
tainty under various penalty regimes); Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of
Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799 (1983) (discussing the risk of inefficient precautions if parties are
uncertain about the standard of care); Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An
Economic Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1994) (discussing the possible
benefits of uncertainty in encouraging legal compliance); Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Finding
and Efficiency: Toward an Economic Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 137
(1987) (examining how the legal system can provide incentives for optimal behavior where parties are
uncertain about liability). These articles assume that the specific source of uncertainty is insignificant
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source of uncertainty (past or future) has no effect on the likelihood of the
possible outcomes-the question whether an uncertain event precedes or
succeeds one's decision has been considered irrelevant. Legal analysis has
thus assumed that as long as probabilities and payoffs are identical, future
uncertainties and past uncertainties induce similar behavior.
Against this conventional assumption, rich experimental literature estab-
lishes that individuals treat postdictions differently than predictions.' In a
series of studies, participants were required to determine whether and to
what extent they wished to engage in a risky activity either before or after
the occurrence of an event, the results of which were unknown. Most impor-
tantly, these studies demonstrate that parties have a strong preference for
guesses of future contingencies over guesses of past contingencies. Indi-
viduals playing games with probabilistic outcomes, for example,
consistently bet more money and take more risk if they initially wager and
then play (a prediction condition) than if they play first and only then wager
(a postdiction condition) . Although objective probabilities and payoffs were
manifestly identical, individuals exhibited more confidence and greater will-
ingness to take risks when uncertainty referred to the future rather than the
past.5
This Article explores the implications of these behavioral findings to le-
gal theory. It shows that the prediction-postdiction distinction cuts across
several domains of legal uncertainty and thus requires careful investigation
of the actual influence it exerts on conduct. More specifically, the following
analysis demonstrates how the prediction-postdiction literature can inform
the design and constitutionality of legal norms, the choice among competing
law-enforcement strategies, and the application of various sentencing prac-
tices. The making of legal norms, the detection of violators, and the
infliction of sanctions may generate different types of uncertainty involving
predictions and postdictions. And policymakers can exploit these differences
to provide optimal incentives.
Attempting to bring the conventional framework closer to the real world,
recent legal scholarship pays increasing attention to the contributions of social
and that individuals who face uncertainty consider their alternatives only on the basis of expected
costs and benefits.
2. Professors Calfee and Craswell, for example, note that "uncertainty occurs whenever
people cannot be sure what legal consequences will attach to each of their possible courses of ac-
tion" and that "[s]uch uncertainty arises from a number of sources." Calfee & Craswell, supra note
1, at 968. Professors Calfee and Craswell then provide examples of uncertainties that can result
from either past or future contingencies (the size of damages, the likelihood a plaintiff files a claim,
or the persuasiveness of witnesses), without distinguishing between the two types of uncertainty. Id.
at 968-69; see also, Hadfield, supra note 1, at 541-42 ("[Assuming] that each person attaches a
certain probability of being held liable for violating the law to a given behavior or activity ... these
probabilities might range between one and zero for numerous reasons, including imperfect enforce-
ment (not all violators are caught or convicted), mistakes in the determination of factual issues, and
errors in the identification of the applicable legal rule."). As the following analysis shows, such
uncertainties can involve both predictions and postdictions.
3. See infra Section L.A (presenting the results of the prediction-postdiction experiments).
4. See infra Section I.A.
5. See infra Section I.A.
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science studies about how individuals form their choices and preferences.
Scholars have supplemented the traditional rational-choice assumption with
models that take into account the results of empirical and experimental stud-
ies concerning actual conduct.7 In the context of uncertainty, legal analysis
has already addressed the important ramifications of several such behavioral
findings. For example, scholars have shown that the observed difference in
attitudes toward probabilistic gains and probabilistic losses, or in the percep-
tion of small and large probabilities, can be an important factor in the
application of various legal doctrines. While this analysis has advanced our
understanding of the actual effects of legal uncertainty, this Article demon-
strates that current scholarship has overlooked important behavioral findings
concerning the difference between past and future uncertainties.
Part I of this Article presents the robust experimental literature on the
prediction-postdiction distinction and then discusses the explanations for
differences in conduct when faced with future and past uncertainty. The
scholarship shows that attitudes toward predictions and postdictions are
deeply rooted in human psychology. Part II explores the legal relevance of
the behavioral findings by discussing their bearing on three related contexts.
6. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471 (1998) (emphasizing the importance of incorporating the results of experimental and
empirical studies into the conventional analysis); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051 (2000) (demonstrating the contributions of behavioral studies to the understanding of
decision making).
7. For an overview of legal scholarship that draws from behavioral studies, see, for exam-
ple, Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998), and Christine Jolls, Behavioral
Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 115, 115-40 (Peter
Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007).
8. Experimental studies pioneered by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have estab-
lished a widely accepted model of decision making under conditions of uncertainty called "prospect
theory." The most important finding of this theory is that individuals exhibit a "fourfold pattern of
risk attitudes" when making risky decisions: (1) risk aversion for moderate-to-high-probability
gains, (2) risk seeking for moderate-to-high-probability losses, (3) risk seeking for low-probability
gains, and (4) risk aversion for low-probability losses. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Ad-
vances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
297, 306 (1992). Legal scholarship has applied prospect theory across many areas of law. See, e.g.,
John M.A. DiPippa, How Prospect Theory Can Improve Legal Counseling, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 81 (2001) (legal counseling); Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of
Consequential Damages: Default Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339, 406-10
(1998) (contracts); Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000) (civil procedure); Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault To Replace
the All-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed in Intentional Tort Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant
Are at Fault, 46 VAND. L. REV. 121, 170-72 (1993) (torts); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduci-
ary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REv. 277, 330-31 (1990) (corporate law);
Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Econom-
ics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 637-39 (1996)
(corporate law); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 113 (1996); Kent W. Smith & Karyl A. Kinsey, Understanding Taxpaying Behavior: A Con-
ceptual Framework with Implications for Research, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 639, 649-50 (1987)
(taxation); Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regulation in an Electronic Age: The Impact of Cogni-
tive Psychology, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 782 (1997) (securities law). For a comprehensive survey,
see Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1115 (2003)
[hereinafter Guthrie, Prospect Theory].
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Section II.A establishes that the distinction between predictions and postdic-
tions is relevant to the optimal design of legal norms, in particular the choice
between rules and standards. Section II.B examines the effects of uncer-
tainty in the area of law enforcement, demonstrating that law-enforcement
authorities may manipulate the type of uncertainty that would be faced by
potential criminals in order to maximize deterrence. Finally, Section II.C
explores the implications of these behavioral results on the application of
criminal sanctions, showing that some sentencing practices result in future
uncertainty while others result in past uncertainty, thus producing different
effects on incentives to engage in crime.
I. BEHAVIORAL FINDINGS
This Part presents existing experimental literature that explores how
prediction and postdiction affect risk perception. It establishes the robust-
ness of support for the idea that people have different attitudes with respect
to past and future guesses, and it shows that these differences are grounded
in deeply rooted behavioral dispositions.
A. Experimental Research
In a well-known study by Rothbart and Snyder, participants were di-
vided into two groups and required to bet on the results of a die toss. 9 In the
first group, participants initially rolled the die (to a distance out of sight) and
then guessed the outcome.'0 In the second group, participants first made
their prediction; only then was the die tossed." The experiment was such
that it evidenced to participants that the toss was fair and that the experi-
menters could not affect the results.' 2 Except for the sequence of the game
(toss and then bet or bet and then toss), the procedure of the experiment was
identical in both groups. 3
The conventional rational-choice paradigm would not predict any differ-
ence in the behavior of the participants. Because the level of risk and the
likelihood of success were equal for both groups, participants' behavior was
expected to be similar. However, the results of the experiment showed that
participants in the second group (bet and then toss) were more confident in
being correct: They bet almost twice as much as participants in the first
group (toss and then bet)."4 Using the same experimental setting, Strickland
and his co-authors similarly found that participants who first rolled a die and
9. Myron Rothbart & Mark Snyder, Confidence in the prediction and postdiction of an
uncertain outcome, 2 CAN. J. BEHAV. SC. 38 (1970).
10. Id. at 39-40.
11. Id.
12. In both groups, the participants themselves rolled the die, which fell to a distance beyond
the experimenters' control. Id. at 39.
13. Id. at 39-40.
14. Id. at 40-42.
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then guessed manifested "apparent conservatism" and were more risk averse
as compared to participants who guessed first and then tossed. 15
Another study, by Ladouceur and Mayrand, compared and examined
postdiction and prediction in a roulette game. 6 At the beginning of the ex-
periment, participants were awarded ten dollars and were randomly assigned
to one of two experimental groups, either betting before or after the throw
(in the latter case, a piece of cardboard was immediately placed on the rou-
lette section hiding the slot into which the ball fell). 7 Participants in the
roulette game could decide not only the size but also the type of wager. They
could choose, for example, to bet on an exact number (a likelihood of 1:38),
a column (likelihood of 1:4), a color (1:2), or a combination of several bets
with different likelihoods of winning." The results showed that participants
in the prediction condition (bet and then spin) both invested significantly
more money and took more risky wagers.19
The experiments by Rothbart and Snyder, and Ladouceur and Mayrand,
involved only a positive payoff (a reward for a correct guess) and applied a
"between subjects" design.20 Later studies replicated these experiments us-
ing a "within subjects" design and included the possibility of a negative
21payoff for an incorrect guess . In an experiment conducted by Brun and
Teigen, for example, participants were given the option to choose the format
of the bet.2 They could guess the outcome first and then throw the die or
throw first and guess the outcome afterwards. 3 Before being offered this
choice, participants were randomly assigned to three groups.2" In the "Re-
ward Condition," participants received a positive reward for a correct guess.
In the "Punishment Condition," participants received a negative payoff for
an incorrect guess. Finally, in the "Neutral Condition," participants received
neither a reward for a correct guess nor a sanction for an incorrect guess.
The results of the experiment indicated that in all groups, a majority of par-
15. Lloyd H. Strickland et al., Temporal Orientation and Perceived Control as Determinants
of Risk-Taking, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 143, 149 (1966).
16. Robert Ladouceur & Marie Mayrand, The Level of Involvement and the Timing of Betting
in Roulette, 121 J. PSYCHOL. 169 (1987).
17. Id. at 171-72.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 173-76.
20. A "between-subject" design is based on the coexistence of groups that face different
tasks. Thus, in the experiments described, some individuals were engaged in predictions while oth-
ers were engaged in postdictions. A "within-subject" design confronts all subjects with different
tasks. Thus, all subjects confronted both predictions and postdictions.
21. Wibecke Brun & Karl H. Teigen, Prediction and Postdiction Preferences in Guessing, 3
J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 17 (1990).





ticipants preferred prediction over postdiction, thus providing "clear evi-
dence for a guess-first preference."25
Tossing a die and betting on roulette are rather artificial environments.
Additional studies have demonstrated that "prediction preference" also oc-
curs in more realistic settings. For example, in an experiment by Heath and
Tversky, participants chose between two possible bets:
1. A stock is selected at random from the Wall Street Journal. You guess
whether it will go up or down tomorrow. If you're right, you win $5.
2. A stock is selected at random from the Wall Street Journal. You guess
whether it went up or down yesterday. You cannot check the paper. If
you're right, you win $5.26
From a group of more than 180 participants, nearly seventy percent "pre-
ferred to bet on tomorrow's closing price. 27 Similar results were obtained in
21a study involving guessing the sex of a baby. Participants were asked to
choose between betting on the sex of a child before or after delivery had
taken place.29 Although under both alternatives the prospects of a correct
guess were equal, a substantial majority (seventy-nine percent) preferred to
bet on the child's sex before rather than after birth.30
Other studies have established divergent attitudes about postdiction and
prediction in contexts in which factors other than sheer luck determine out-
comes. For example, Friedland and his co-authors asked participants to bet
on the performance of basketball players.3 Participants were asked to
choose whether to guess the outcome of an NBA game either before or after
the game was held (the actual result would only be known later).32 The study
used a nine-point scale, where the low end indicated a preference for betting
33after the game and the high end a preference for betting before the game.
Participants' average score was around seven, thus indicating a desire to bet
on the future rather than on the past.34 Brun and Teigen obtained comparable
results in a similar experiment, involving betting on a soccer match.35 Of
ninety-three participants, eighty-two individuals (88%) preferred to bet before
25. Id. at 21.
26. Chip Heath & Amos Tversky, Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in
Choice under Uncertainty, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 8-9 (1991) (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 9.
28. Brun & Teigen, supra note 21, at 22-23.
29. Id. at 22.
30. Id. at 23.
31. Nehemia Friedland et al., Controlling the Uncontrollable: Effects of Stress on Illusory
Perceptions of Controllability, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 923, 926-30 (1992).
32. Id. at 927.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 928.
35. Brun & Teigen, supra note 21, at 22-23.
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the game, nine individuals (10%) chose to bet after the game, and two indi-
36
viduals (2%) expressed no preference.
Similar patterns of risk-taking behavior have been observed in experi-
ments involving interactive decisions. As the results of such experiments
have shown, whether a participant decides before or after other participants
have made their decisions often affects her actual choice. Budescu and his
co-authors have demonstrated this phenomenon in experiments investigating
"resource dilemma games."37 In these experiments, a group of participants
has an opportunity to win an amount of money, to be distributed among the
group members.38 The game requires each participant to first determine her
relative share, without knowing what the demands of the other participants
are. Then, participants' decisions are revealed and aggregated. If the total
sum of the participants' demands is lower than the fixed amount, each par-
ticipant receives the sum she has claimed.39 If the total is higher than the
fixed amount, the participants receive nothing. ° From a strictly economic
perspective, whether the game is played such that participants decide simul-
taneously or one after another should not affect their choices. Given that
other participants' demands are unobservable in both cases, the level of un-
certainty each participant faces in either format of the game is equal.4
Experiments exploring this issue, however, indicate otherwise. Participants
in the sequential format who played first usually demanded more than par-
ticipants playing the game simultaneously; participants who played last
41usually demanded less.
Such behavior was also observed in other decision-making games. In a
recent study, Webber and his co-authors examined the extent to which order
of the "ultimatum game" affects parties' behavior. 3 In their experiment,
36. Id.
37. See e.g., David V. Budescu et al., Simultaneous vs. sequential requests in resource di-
lemmas with incomplete information, 80 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 297 (1992) (describing and
explaining the structure of resource dilemma games).
38. Id. at 299.
39. Id.
40. Id. Participants in resource dilemma games thus face conflicting interests. On the one
hand, a participant who wishes to maximize her payoff should demand a large share. On the other
hand, such behavior increases the likelihood that the total sum of participants' demands will exceed
the fixed amount.
41. Budescu et al. have noted:
In the context of the resource dilemma paradigm... game theory maintains that in the absence
of any information about the requests of the previous players in the sequence, a player who
only knows the temporal order of play has no basis for adjusting her requests. Specifically, the
simultaneous and positional order protocols of play are taken to be formally identical.
David V. Budescu et al., Positional Order and Group Size Effects in Resource Dilemmas with Uncer-
tain Resources, 61 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 225, 228 (1995).
42. Id. at 236.
43. Roberto A. Weber et al., Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and
"Weak Link" Coordination Games, 7 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 25 (2004). The ultimatum game is a
much investigated experimental economics game with two players, the "proposer" and the
"responder." In the basic form of the game, a sum of money is given to the proposer, who must
[Vol. 107:467
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Webber et al. gave every two participants $10. They then divided pairs into
three groups that differed only in the sequence in which participants were
required to make their choices." In the simultaneous condition, "proposers"
and "responders" made their offers or demands at the same time. In the
other two groups, offers and demands occurred sequentially, where either
the proposers or the responders moved first. In all of these experiments, par-
ticipants were informed of the actual sequence at the beginning of the
46game. Analysis of the results shows that parties who played first in the se-
quential conditions were more risk taking than participants who played
second and more risk taking than participants who played simultaneously.
47
For example, for low offers (around $1 to $3), the rejection rates vary from
about 60% to 65% to 80%, depending on whether responders move after, at
48the same time, or before proposers, respectively.
These results suggest that players in interactive games are sensitive to
the temporal dimension of their choices, even when the actual sequence has
no bearing on their chances or expected payoffs. Players in ultimatum and
resource dilemma games who make their decisions at the beginning are re-
quired to bet on the future behavior of other participants. In contrast, players
who act last wager on what other participants have already done. Consistent
with the earlier findings, the former players manifest greater risk-taking be-
havior than the latter players.
B. The Psychology of Risk Perception in Prediction Versus Postdiction
Psychologists have proposed two theories for the apparent differences in
attitudes concerning past and future bets. The first theory is based on the
"illusion of control." Behavioral studies show that individuals often believe
that they can influence the likelihood of stochastic outcomes.49 Because this
illusion of control implies a causal process, it can operate proactively but not
retroactively. To this extent, future bets are associated with a higher probabil-
ity of success. Other studies suggest that wagers with respect to future events
result in more satisfaction (when correct) and less regret (when incorrect) as
compared to such bets regarding past events. 0 Under this theory, predictions
"propose" how to divide this sum with the responder. Simultaneously, the responder must indicate
the minimum amount he is prepared to accept. Neither party knows the other's offer or demand. If
the responder's demand exceeds the proposer's offer, neither participant receives anything; however
if the responder's demand is within the proposer's offer, the responder receives the amount of the
offer, with the proposer receiving the remaining amount. See generally Weiner Gith et al., An Ex-
perimentalAnalysis of Uhimatum Bargaining, 3 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982).
44. Weber et al., supra note 43, at 32-33.
45. Id. at 32.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 33.
48. Id. at 34.
49. See infra Section I.B. 1.
50. See infra Section I.B.2.
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are more attractive because they result in higher psychological payoffs than
identical postdictions.
1. Illusion of Control
Experimental and empirical research indicates that individuals often
assume that they possess at least some control over purely probabilistic
outcomes.5' For example, subjects who are actively involved in chance-
determinant games (for example, deciding the color of the winning marble)
have been found to risk more money and report greater confidence than
subjects who play the same game yet take a more passive role (as when the
winning marble is decided by the experimenter).52 Similarly, when rolling
dice in craps, individuals tend to execute a soft, easy throw if they need a
low number but choose a hard, fast throw when they desire a high number.53
But "although subjects act as if they could control outcomes to which they
have no causal connection ... they apparently accept the limitation that an
event in the past is a 'sealed fate' that they cannot control. 54
Some findings provide evidence that this illusion of control underlies the
preference for prediction over postdiction. In their die-rolling study, Brun
and Teigen requested that participants explain their choice between the two
available formats of the game.55 Although the question was open-ended,
more than a quarter of the participants who wished to guess first explained
that they "imagined themselves to be able to influence the throw."5 6 No other
explanation reached a similar level of support.57 In another study, Burger and
Cooper used a test ("The Desirability of Control Scale") designed to meas-
ure participants' "desire for control over the events in one's life.""
Participants were then divided into two groups, betting either before or after
a toss of a die.59 The results show that while there is a general tendency to
bet more in the prediction condition (bet and then toss), such a tendency is
51. See, e.g., Ellen J. Langer, The illusion of control, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 231 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). For a detailed survey of the ex-
perimental literature, see Paul K. Presson & Victor A. Benassi, Illusion of Control: A Meta-Analytic
Review, 11 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 493 (1996).
52. Camille B. Wortman, Some Determinants of Perceived Control, 31 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 282 (1975).
53. James M. Henslin, Craps and Magic, 73 AM. J. Soc. 316, 319 (1967).
54. Michael W. Morris et al., Time of Decision, Ethical Obligation, and Causal Illusion:
Temporal Cues and Social Heuristics in the Prisoner's Dilemma, in NEGOTIATION AS A SOCIAL
PROCESS 209, 216 (Roderick M. Kramer & David M. Messick eds., 1995).
55. Brun & Teigen, supra note 21, at 20.
56. /d. at 21.
57. See id. at 20-21.
58. Jerry M. Burger & Harris M. Cooper, The Desirability of Control, 3 MOTIVATION &
EMOTION 381, 382-83 (1979).
59. Id. at 389.
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especially present in participants who manifested high desirability of con-
trol.60
Nevertheless, the illusion of control seems to be only a partial explana-
tion. The Brun and Teigen study allowed either the participants or
61experimenters to perform the process of tossing the die. If the "guess-first"
preference is explained in terms of a subjective feeling of control, one could
expect that this preference would decline where the tossing is conducted by
62another agent (the experimenters). However, no such effect was found.63
Furthermore, as indicated by several experiments in which outcomes are
clearly not subject to control (for example, stock performance or the gender
of a newborn), "the preference to bet on future rather than past events is ob-
served even when the illusion of control does not provide a plausible
explanation."64
2. Information Availability: Satisfaction and Regret
A second theory for the differences between postdiction and prediction
involves the availability of information and the consequences of that avail-
ability in our perception of uncertainty. In prediction, uncertainty is
objective-everybody faces it. It is only possible in retrospect to determine
whether the wager was correct. In contrast, at the time in which postdiction
is made the relevant information exists, and some agents may already have
access to this information. As such, uncertainty with respect to events that
have already occurred is subjective.
Whether uncertainty is subjective or not has been shown to affect
65choices in the context of chance. In Ellsberg's famous experiment, for ex-
ample, individuals were found to prefer betting on the color of a bead drawn
from an urn with 50 red and 50 blue beads to betting on the color of a bead
drawn from an urn containing 100 blue and red beads with unknown propor-
tions.66 The first situation models a state of objective uncertainty, in which it
is clear to all that the chance of pulling a specific color is fifty percent. The
60. Burger and Cooper awarded participants $50 as an endowment. Among participants who
manifested "low desirability of control," the average total bet in the postdiction condition was
$20.90, as compared to $22.80 in the prediction condition; among participants who showed "high
desirability of control," the average total bet was $25.30 in the postdiction condition and $37.20 in
the prediction condition. Id. at 390.
61. Brun & Teigen, supra note 21, at 20.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Heath & Tversky, supra note 26, at 8.
65. For the difference in behavior in the context of subjective and objective uncertainty, see,
for example, Karl Halvor Teigen, Variants of Subjective Probabilities: Concepts, Norms and Biases,
in SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY 211 (George Wright & Peter Ayton eds., 1994). In fact, recent neural
research has shown that decision making involving subjective and objective uncertainties takes part
in different areas of the brain. See Kirsten G. Volz et al., Variants of uncertainty in decision-making
and their neural correlates, 67 BRAIN REs. BULL. 403 (2005).




second situation, however, is one of subjective uncertainty, in which the ac-
tual proportions of the beads-though unknown to the picker-may well
dictate a specific guess (betting on the color with the higher proportion of
beads). Although from the perspective of probability theory both bets are
identical, individuals sense more dissatisfaction when making incorrect
guesses involving subjective uncertainty.67 Psychologists have suggested
such perception makes postdiction psychologically unattractive as compared
to similar prediction.68
Miller and Gunasegaram have demonstrated the role that blame assign-
ment plays in explaining the difference between future and past bets.69 In
their first experiment, Miller and Gunasegaram asked a group of eighty-
eight participants to consider a "matching-pennies" game with two indi-
viduals-Jones and Cooper.7 ° In the hypothetical game described to the
participants, Jones and Cooper are each asked to toss a coin. Jones and
Cooper are told that if both coins come up the same (two heads or two tails)
they will be rewarded $1,000; if the coins do not match, neither will receive
anything. Jones tosses first and comes up with heads. Cooper goes next and
gets tails. Jones and Cooper thus do not win.7' Miller and Gunasegaram
asked the participants to predict who "will experience more guilt-Jones or
Cooper? And will Jones blame Cooper more or will Cooper blame Jones
more for their failure to win $1,000?' 2 Since the outcome of the game de-
pends only on chance, probability provides no reason to attribute the actual
result to either of the players. Nevertheless, nearly ninety percent of the par-
ticipants predicted that Cooper (the second player) "would experience more
guilt.., and would be blamed more by Jones... than vice versa.
' 73
The matching-pennies experiment suggests that parties who fail to ad-
just their behavior by guessing future outcomes are perceived as less
responsible than parties who fail to adjust their behavior to comply with past
contingencies. To corroborate their findings, Miller and Gunasegaram con-
ducted another study.74 In their follow-up experiment, they asked
participants to consider the following hypothetical: A professor distributes a
list of three study questions to her class and announces that the exam will
67. Id. at 656-69.
68. See, e.g., Brun & Teigen, supra note 21, at 26 ("[T]he contrast between an incorrect
answer and an already existing fact may appear greater than to be mistaken about results not yet
established. In prediction, no guess is wrong, at least not at the time it is issued... "); Heath &
Tversky, supra note 26, at 9 (arguing that the difference between bets with respect to future and past
events is that "[in prediction, only the future can prove you wrong; in postdiction, you could be
wrong right now").
69. Dale T. Miller & Saku Gunasegaram, Temporal Order and the Perceived Mutability of
Events: Implications for Blame Assignment, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1111 (1990).




74. Id. at 1113.
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consist of one of these questions. Because of time constraints, Nancy, a stu-
dent, prepares for only two questions. It turns out that Nancy did not prepare
for the actual exam question. Participants were divided into two groups and
told that the teacher selected the question either before or after Nancy stud-
ied for the exam.75 The participants were then asked "[w]hich of the
following two thoughts is Nancy most likely to have in this circumstance:
(a) Why did the professor select this question? or (b) Why didn't I prepare
for this question? '76 The results show that the participants expected Nancy
to be critical of the teacher when she studied before the teacher selected the
question in the exam." In contrast, the participants predicted that Nancy
would feel more accountable where she failed to postdict the questions se-
71lected by the teacher.
Thus, while the theory of the illusion of control is concerned with prob-
abilities, the subjective-objective explanation suggests that the difference
between prediction and postdiction lies in the nature of the uncertainty.
Most importantly, the subjective-objective explanation maintains that indi-
viduals perceive correct and incorrect guesses of future and past events
differently. As Tversky and Kahneman have explained, "Uncertainty about
past events is likely to be experienced as ignorance, especially if the truth is
known to someone else, whereas uncertainty about the future is more natu-
rally attributed to the dispositions of the relevant system.
' 79
II. PREDICTION, POSTDICTION, AND THE LAW
What are the implications of these behavioral findings for the legal sys-
tem? Can the legal system exploit the inclination to predict and the
reluctance to postdict? This Part explores the relevance of the prediction-
postdiction studies in three related legal contexts: Section II.A shows that
the behavioral differences between postdiction and prediction affect the op-
timal specificity of legal norms; Section II.B establishes the importance of
these findings for the efficacy of possible law-enforcement strategies; and
finally, Section II.C establishes the relevance of behavioral differences to the
design of legal sanctions.
A. The Optimal Specificity of Law: On the Choice
Between Rules and Standards
Both rules and standards are legal norms that adjudicators use to evalu-
ate actions. Standards and rules can be depicted as two extremes in a one-
dimensional space representing the degree of specificity of legal norms.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1113-14 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 1114.
78. Id.




Standards are open-ended norms, allowing the adjudicator to make fact-
specific determinations, such as whether a driver used "reasonable care" in a
given situation. A rule, conversely, is a more specific and concrete norm and
consequently leaves less discretion to the decision maker than a standard.'s
The distinction between rules and standards is, in practice, a matter of de-
gree. A legal norm can be more or less rule-like or standard-like. To simplify
matters, however, we shall refer only to these two pure types of norms: rules
on the one hand and standards on the other.
Rules and standards may both generate uncertainty. Standards are legal
norms whose interpretation is provided only ex post by the courts. Standards,
therefore, produce future uncertainty resulting from the indeterminacy of the
interpretation given to them ex post by the courts. Rules are concrete norms
that leave no (or little) discretion to decision makers.8 Yet individuals whose
behavior is governed by rules are not always familiar with the specific de-
tails of a rule; especially where the applicable rule is complex,
familiarization with its content is often costly.82 Individuals who know that
their behavior is governed by rules-but fail to familiarize themselves with
the rules-thus face uncertainty concerning already existing regulation or
legislation. In contrast to standards, this type of uncertainty requires indi-
viduals to postdict the content of the law.
Before exploring the implications of this observation, let us first exam-
ine the traditional way in which the debate concerning the optimal
specificity of law has been described in the legal literature. After presenting
the conventional considerations governing the choice between rules and
standards, we will examine whether and in what ways the findings concern-
ing the difference between postdiction and prediction may be relevant to the
optimal design of legal norms."
80. On the distinction between specified and general legal norms, their relative advantages,
and the role of the courts in their application, see, for example, Douglas G. Baird & Robert
Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV.
1217, 1227-28 (1982).
81. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 380 (1985). For a dis-
cussion of the importance that legal theory has given to the ex ante/ex post characteristics of rules
and standards, see, for example, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 559 (1992) ("Arguments about and definitions of rules and standards commonly
emphasize the distinction between whether the law is given content ex ante or ex post.").
82. "Actors seeking to comply with more complex rules may need to expend resources to
learn how the rules apply to their contemplated acts .... [And] because acquiring information is
costly, some will choose not to learn the rules" Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity
of Legal Rules, II J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 151 (1995) (footnote omitted).
83. Recent legal scholarship has observed the possible implications of psychological studies
on the choice between rules and standards, yet it has not addressed the importance of behavioral
findings concerning uncertainty. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal
Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REv. 23 (2000); see also Yuval Feldman & Alon
Harel, Social Norms, Self Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis of the
Rule v. Standard Dilemma, 4 REv. LAW & ECON. 81 (2008) (discussing the impact of social norms
on willingness to obey the law and the optimal specificity of legal norms).
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The use of rules and standards, as law and economics scholars have
shown, involves different costs and benefits."' The cost of producing stan-
dards is typically lower, but standards usually entail higher enforcement and
compliance costs than rules.85 Formulating a standard "to take reasonable
care in all matters" would be extremely easy and nearly costless. Yet apply-
ing this standard would generate significant costs for both judges, who
would have to determine whether the defendants have complied with the
standard or not (enforcement costs), and potential defendants, who have to
determine what level of care is necessary to escape liability (compliance
costs).86 In the case of specific norms, the relative size of costs is exactly the
opposite. 7 The legislature or the regulator incurs larger production costs in
creating a rule than in creating a standard because it has to specify more
precisely the scope of the rule and its consequences. On the other hand,
rules are typically easier to apply than standards, and their compliance and
88enforcement costs are lower than those of standards.
While these efficiency considerations are straightforward, assessing the
actual production, enforcement, and compliance costs is often difficult in
practice. Nevertheless, law and economics scholars have suggested that
policymakers can use the frequency of the regulated activity as a proxy for
determining the relative magnitude of these costs.89 Rules are preferable when
the regulated activity is frequent, while standards do best when behavior var-
ies so greatly that any particular scenario is rare.9° Designing a rule for a rarescenario is too costly, and the use of a standard is therefore preferable given
84. The two most comprehensive law and economics analyses of rules and standards are
Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257 (1974), and Kaplow, supra note 81. For additional applications of economic analysis to rules
and standards, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L. 65
(1983); Hadfield, supra note I; Kaplow, supra note 82; Schlag, supra note 81; and Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953 (1995).
85. Feldman & Harel, supra note 83, at 87.
86. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 84, at 262-69 (discussing the advantages of rules
over standards in guiding behavior and in allowing courts to avoid high adjudication costs, while
emphasizing that the production costs of standards are typically lower); Kaplow, supra note 81, at
568-85 (elaborating on the factors that determine the actual costs involved in formulation of, en-
forcement of, and compliance with legal norms with different levels of precision).
87. See Feldman & Harel, supra note 83, at 87.
88. See id. In some contexts, rules and standards may also differ in other economic aspects,
such as their influence on the likelihood of settlements or the incentives to purchase legal advice.
See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 84, at 269-70. The behavioral findings concerning the differences
between future and past uncertainty may also bear on the analysis of these aspects. But these topics
are beyond the scope of this paper.
89. As Kaplow explains:
Designing a rule that accounts for every relevant contingency would be wasteful, as most
would never arise. Although it might be more difficult and costly for an individual and an en-
forcement authority to apply a standard in a particular instance, such an application need be
made only if its unique set of circumstances actually arises. Thus when frequency is low, a
standard tends to be preferable.
Kaplow, supra note 81, at 563; see also Korobkin, supra note 83, at 31-35.
90. Korobkin, supra note 83, at 33.
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the lower costs of producing standards.9 When the activity is frequent, how-
ever, application of standards entails large compliance and enforcement
costs. 9' Thus, when behavior is common, regulation by rules is often more
efficient.
As for uncertainty, law and economics scholars have pointed out that
under both rules and standards, individuals might be uninformed about the
content of the norm. 93 Most importantly, law and economics analysis has
claimed that in such cases the actual specificity of the norm has no effect on
conduct. Thus, in one of the more influential papers on the economic analy-
sis of rules and standards, Professor Kaplow writes:
[U]ninformed individuals' behavior does not depend on whether a rule or
standard prevails, so the benefits and harms of individuals' acts will be the
same. Thus in this case, whether a rule or standard is preferable will de-
pend solely on the differences in promulgation and enforcement costs.
94
The findings concerning the differences between prediction and postdiction,
however, suggest that the source of uncertainty (rules or standards) does
affect behavior. As shown above, the uncertainty standards generate relates
to the future: it is uncertainty concerning the interpretation given to the
standards by the courts ex post. Individuals who face such uncertainty there-
fore face the need to perform predictions concerning the way the standard
will be interpreted. Rules, in contrast, may involve only past uncertainty.
Individuals who know that legal rule settles the question but do not know
the content of the applicable legal norm are involved in postdictions. The
experimental findings therefore imply that individuals will be less inclined
to engage in uncertain rule-governed activities than in uncertain standards-
governed activities. The more rule-governed an activity is, and the more com-
plex the rules governing it are, the lesser the inclination to engage in the
activity.95 Transforming a standards-governed activity into a rule-governed
activity transforms uncertainty (at least from the perspective of the individuals
who are unable or disinclined to learn the rules) from future uncertainty into
past uncertainty.96 This change is likely to affect conduct. To better understand
these effects, consider the regulation of driving and alcohol consumption.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Kaplow, supra note 8 1, at 572.
94. Id.
95. The more complex a rule is, the more difficult or costly it is to acquire information about
it. Hence complex rules are ones which are likely to generate uncertainty.
96. Changing from a rule-based scheme to a standards-based scheme or vice versa is not a
rare event. Speed limits could be specified numerically (a rule) or in vague terms such as "reason-
able speed" (a standard). In 1995, Montana eliminated its numerical daytime speed limit on its
interstate highways and adopted instead a standard of "reasonable and prudent" daytime driving. For
a discussion, see Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. REv.
155 (1999). The rule eventually was invalidated on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague.
See State v. Stanko, 974 P.2d 1132 (Mont. 1998). Drunk driving provides an example for the oppo-




Drunk driving is currently regulated by rules rather than standards.
These rules determine the upper legal limit of alcohol (which is typically
0.08%) in drivers' blood.97 Although there are some attempts at producing a
device that drivers can use to calculate blood alcohol content, most indi-
viduals do not and cannot determine what their blood alcohol content is. 9 To
this extent, from a driver's perspective, an alternative standard-like norm of
regulating drunk driving-such as a standard that dictates a person ought
not to drive when her ability to drive safely is significantly impaired by al-'
cohol-would be as costly to comply with as the rule based on the blood
alcohol content.
Although the level of uncertainty and the cost of compliance are essen-
tially similar under both forms of regulation, the behavioral findings suggest
that drivers' behavior under a rule or a standard is likely to be different.
More specifically, if the purpose of the legal norms governing drunk driving
is to induce drivers to err on the side of caution, legal rules of the type used
now may be preferable to legal standards of the type suggested above. Driv-
ers who face legal rules based on blood alcohol content would be more risk
averse than drivers who would face a legal standard prohibiting driving
when, for instance, alcohol impairs significantly one's ability to drive. Con-
sequently, the use of a rule based on blood alcohol content is more effective
and hence more desirable in deterring unsafe driving than the use of a stan-
dard.
The propensity to be more risk averse when faced with rule-based norms
(as compared to standards-based norms) challenges the traditional legal pref-
erence for specified and precise regulation in the context of constitutional
rights. The clearest manifestation of this preference is the doctrine of "void for
97. See Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Highway Loss Data Institute, DUI/DWI
Laws (Aug. 2008), http://www.iihs.org/laws/dui.aspx (presenting laws regarding drunk driving in all
states). In the past, drunk driving was regulated under a general norm prohibiting "driving while
intoxicated (DWI)." Because this standard was "difficult to prove,"
once BAC [Blood Alcohol Testing] devices became commercially available in the 1930s,
states developed presumptions allowing juries to presume that certain BAC percentages im-
plied intoxication. However, proving intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt was still a
difficult task....
State legislatures, with the encouragement of Congress, responded to this enforcement problem
by enacting "per se" laws .... Today, nearly every state has enacted a per se law, in addition
to retaining the offense of DWI.
Jennifer L. Pariser, Note, In Vino Veritas: The Truth About Blood Alcohol Presumptions in State
Drunk Driving Law, 64 N.YU. L. REV. 141, 142-44 (1989) (footnotes omitted). In 2003, the state
of Massachusetts was among the last states to adopt a rule-like regime to regulate drunk driving. See
Kelsey P. Black, Note, Undue Protection Versus Undue Punishment: Examining the Drinking and
Driving Problem Across the United States, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 463, 476 (2007) ("Prior to 2003
in Massachusetts, the .08% BAC level was not a per se law; it was 'evidence but not proof of
drunkenness.' In 2003, however, Massachusetts finally adopted a per se BAC law . (footnote
omitted)).
98. See, e.g., Alana Semuels, Too Drunk to Drive? Devices May Help Decide, PTrSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 31, 2004, at Al (describing attempts to develop devices that would provide
drivers with information about their blood alcohol and the "criticism" of such devices).
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vagueness."99 Under this doctrine "a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law."' °
One of the rationales underlying the doctrine is the conviction that vague
legal norms operate to inhibit the exercise of freedoms and that "[u]ncertain
meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone...
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.' ,,0 In
cases of norms declared void for vagueness, courts have often replaced the
vague standards that have such "chilling effects" with more narrowly-
tailored rules.' °2 Thus, the legislature can at times remedy the defect by en-
acting more specific rules-ones that do not leave too much discretion to
officials or judges.'O' Most importantly, the void-for-vagueness doctrine pro-
vides incentives for legislatures to prefer rules over standards in contexts in
which the proposed legal norm may infringe upon fundamental rights.
While courts are justifiably concerned about the uncertainty that stan-
dards cause-and resulting chilling effects-there is no similar concern
regarding the chilling effects of rules, because it is often (wrongly) believed
that only standards produce uncertainty and therefore only standards can
have chilling effects."" The prediction-postdiction literature indicates that
rules-especially complex rules whose content is costly to acquire-may
induce even greater inhibition of lawful behavior. To this extent, where leg-
islatures replace standards found to be void for vagueness with a complex
set of rules designed to replace vague terms, they may paradoxically gener-
99. For an overview, see Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CsuM. L. 279 (2003). See also Symposium: Void for Vagueness,
82 CAL. L. REV. 487 (1994).
100. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
101. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Hadfield, supra note 1, at 544 (discussing the economic implica-
tions of overprotective behavior).
102. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520 (1948) ("To say that a state may not
punish by such a vague statute carries no implication that it may not punish circulation of objection-
able printed matter ... by the use of apt words to describe the prohibited publications."); see also
Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 111 (1960)
("[The vagueness cases] purport to pass upon the legitimacy or illegitimacy of means, invalidating a
particular regulation with regard to those as to whom it is indefinite and because it is indefinite, and
reserving judgment as to whether the end sought to be achieved is achievable through more definite
regulation." (footnotes omitted)).
103. One of the most well known examples for such an attempt is the proposal of Andrea
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon to regulate pornography. The proposal included a very detailed
set of provisions designed to overcome concerns about vagueness. For a description and a defense of
this proposal, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985). The proposal was later adopted by the legislature of Indianapolis. However,
the Seventh Circuit found that this proposal violated the First Amendment. See Am. Booksellers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
104. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62 (1992) ("[R]ules afford certainty and predictabil-
ity to private actors, enabling them to order their affairs productively. Standards produce uncertainty,
thereby chilling socially productive behavior." (footnotes omitted)).
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ate greater chilling effects than the chilling effects of the standards found to
be void under existing doctrine.
A recent Supreme Court case illustrates how an attempt to use legal
rules may in fact increase rather than decrease the chilling effects of legal
norms. In Hill v. Colorado, the Court discussed a provision of Colorado law:
[It is unlawful] within 100 feet of the entrance to any health care facility
.... for any person to "knowingly approach" within eight feet of another
person, without that person's consent, "for the purpose of passing a leaflet
or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education,
or counseling with such other person."'0 5
A majority of the Court decided to uphold the provision and rejected the
argument, supported by Justice Kennedy, that the provision was too vague.'-
Among the arguments of the majority was the fact that the provision was
rule-like. It used precise terms to define the forbidden behavior and to draw
precise criteria to determine when and where a protester would be forbidden
from exercising free speech rights.'0 7 Perhaps most revealingly, Justice
Stevens, speaking for the majority, maintained that "[a] bright-line prophy-
lactic rule may be the best way to provide protection, and, at the same time,
by offering clear guidance and avoiding subjectivity, to protect speech it-
self."' °
The behavioral findings back up Justice Kennedy's argument that this
reasoning is deficient. A protester may be chilled from exercising his free
speech rights not because the provision is too vague but because it is too
precise. Since it is difficult for a person to precisely evaluate the distance
between herself and an object, a rule requiring a distance of "100 feet of the
entrance to any health care facility" and "eight feet of another person" can
be hard to follow. 9 The uncertainty generated by the rule (past uncertainty)
may be more chilling than the uncertainty generated by an equivalent standard
(future uncertainty), such as a standard requiring the maintenance of "reason-
able distances." This may require courts to complement the doctrine of "void
for vagueness" with a doctrine that guarantees that the rules replacing the
vague standards are simple and information concerning these rules is avail-
able, thereby eliminating the necessity to postdict. Otherwise, the remedy
105. 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000).
106. Id. at 732-33.
107. Id. at 729.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 707, 773-74. In his opinion, Justice Kennedy discussed another related uncertainty
that requires postdiction on the part of potential defendants:
Finally, as we all know, the identity or enterprise of the occupants of a building which fronts
on a public street is not always known to the public. Health care providers may occupy but a
single office in a large building. The Colorado citizen may walk from a disfavored-speech




proposed by courts to the problem of the chilling effects of standards may
be worse than the disease itself.
In the contexts of drunk driving and constitutional liberties, the behav-
ioral literature suggests that the reluctance to postdict favors the use of one
type of norm over another. In the case of drunk driving, it shows that the use
of complex rules rather than standards can serve to increase deterrence. In
the case of constitutional liberties, it establishes that complex rules are
likely to generate chilling effects that are greater than those that result from
standards. Sometimes, however, the normative implications of the reluctance
to postdict are unclear.
Consider, for example, the regulation of potentially polluting activities.
From a social perspective, such activities should be encouraged where their
benefits outweigh their costs and prevented when their net return is negative.
A regulator can deter undesirable polluting activity by applying a general
standard such as prohibiting (or imposing liability for) "unreasonable" or
"unnecessary" pollution. Alternatively, the regulator can develop a set of
rules governing pollution and impose criminal or civil liability for violating
these rules. The empirical findings suggest that the rule-governed regulation
has greater deterrent effect than standards-governed regulation because rule-
governed activity requires individuals to postdict."°A rule-governed scheme
(particularly a complex one) would be more effective in discouraging indi-
viduals from polluting than a standards-governed scheme, both in cases in
which the activity that generates the pollution is socially desirable and in
cases in which it is undesirable. In contrast, a standards-like scheme is less
likely to impede cost-effective activities but also less likely to prevent cases
of "inefficient" pollution. In other words, rule-governed activity is more
likely to deter undesirable behavior but is also more likely to over-deter de-
sirable activity, while standards-governed activity is less likely to deter
desirable activity but may also under-deter undesirable activity. The choice
between a rule-governed scheme and a standards-governed scheme therefore
has both costs and benefits, and those should be weighted carefully against
each other.
To conclude, the legal debate concerning the specificity of legal norms
has overlooked the effect of uncertainty on conduct. Under the conventional
perception, the behavior of uninformed individuals is assumed to be identi-
cal whether the applicable law is in the form of a rule or a standard. The
prediction-postdiction studies, however, indicate that this assumption is
false. Different levels of specificity, even when producing the same level of
uncertainty, can inhibit or encourage behavior. As the preceding analysis has
demonstrated, regulators and judges ought to consider these effects in
choosing the desirable form of legal norms.
The behavioral findings concerning past and future uncertainty are also
important for the ways in which the law (either a rule or a standard) is ap-
plied. The next Section discusses the importance of the prediction-
postdiction studies for the optimal design of law-enforcement policy.
110. See supra Section I.A.
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B. Future and Past Uncertainty and Law Enforcement
Public and private investments in law enforcement can increase the like-
lihood of crime detection. Methods of law enforcement can be divided into
two types. Some methods are designed such that facts preceding the com-
mission of the offense determine the chances of apprehension. Others are
designed such that facts succeeding the commission of the crime determine
whether the offender will be detected or not. The behavioral literature on
uncertainty suggests that the deterrent effects of the former type of law-
enforcement methods are greater than the deterrent effects of the latter type.
Thus, at least as long as deterrence is the primary concern, priority should
be given to the former type in making decisions about the allocation of re-
sources to law enforcement.
Consider, for example, car owners who wish to deter thieves. Imagine
that owners may choose between either hiring a private force that will peri-
odically patrol the neighborhood looking for suspicious drivers or installing
a LoJack in a car so that it is possible to locate the thieves once the car is
stolen."' While both types of investments raise the probability of detection
and thus increase deterrence, they are likely to differ in their effects. The
presence or the absence of a LoJack is determined prior to the commission
of the offense. Stealing a car thus requires the thief to postdict whether a
LoJack has been installed or not. In contrast, the possibility of an encounter
with a patrol is a future contingency that depends on factors that are deter-
mined after the commission of the crime. The differential attitudes toward
postdiction and prediction suggest that, all other things being equal, invest-
ing in LoJacks should be more effective in deterring car thefts than investing
in increasing the number of patrols. Thieves' willingness to take risks of the
latter type (an accidental encounter with a patrol after stealing a car) is
higher than their willingness to take risks of the former type (stealing a car
with a LoJack).
To be sure, it is difficult without further data to evaluate which law-
enforcement mechanism is more efficient. First, the relative cost of each
mechanism is different. Second, patrols are likely to reduce various types of
crimes besides car thefts; LoJacks, by contrast, deter only car-related
crimes. Finally, and most importantly, one must explore whether and to
what extent criminals are aware when investments in patrols or LoJacks are
made. For example, if criminals cannot tell whether car owners install
LoJacks-while they are sensitive to the operation of the police-
investments in patrols provide greater deterrence." '
The prediction-postdiction findings, however, are important not only for
choosing between two different law-enforcement strategies, such as LoJacks
Ill. LoJack is a hidden transmitter installed in automobiles. When a vehicle equipped with
LoJack is stolen, the transmitter helps police locate the stolen vehicle. For more details, see LoJack
Car Security System for Stolen Vehicle Recovery, http://lojack.com (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
112. For a study investigating the effectiveness of LoJacks, see Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt,
Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of
Lojack, 113 Q. J. EcON. 43 (1998).
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and patrols. The behavioral findings concerning past and future uncertainty
can also affect the way in which a specific law-enforcement strategy should
be applied, as the example of probabilistic monitoring demonstrates.
Tax evasion is a serious public concern. According to its own estimate,
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") fails to collect about seventeen percent
of total federal income taxes due, which amounts to over $345 billion."3
This figure exceeds the combined amounts appropriated to the Departments
of Education, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Inte-
rior, Justice, Labor, State, Energy, and Commerce, as well as to the
Judiciary." 4 Because the IRS cannot review all tax files, it only examines a
small percentage (about one percent) of the files." 5 The identity of the indi-
viduals and corporations that are subject to auditing is determined in several
ways. First, the IRS audits tax returns that include irregularities or that ap-• - 116
pear on their face to be suspicious or incomplete. Second, because tax
evasion is not always detectable through technical examination of the forms,
the IRS also conducts random auditing, in which some tax returns are cho-
sen for auditing on a random basis from the entire population."' In addition,
the IRS also conducts random audits within certain specified subpopulations
that, according to IRS records, are more likely to submit false tax returns.'
18
With respect to the two last categories, the IRS employs a probabilistic sys-
tem of auditing.
113. "IRS enforcement activities, coupled with other late payments, recover about $55 billion
of the tax gap, leaving a net tax gap of $290 billion . I..." internal Revenue Service, IRS Updates
Tax Gap Estimates, Feb. 14, 2006, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154496,00.html. The
total federal budget is approximately $1.8 trillion. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Citizen's Guide to the
Federal Budget: Fiscal Year 2001, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy01/guide02.html (last
visited Aug. 30, 2008). These numbers refer to year 2001, currently the most recent year with final-
ized data.
114. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 96 (2006), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/
fy06/pdf/hist.pdf.
115. The primary results of the 2006 IRS survey show that the audit coverage of individual
return was 0.98%. In the year of 2000, this rate was only 0.49%, although this was after a sharp drop
from the previous years (for example, 1.28% in 1997). See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FISCAL
YEAR 2006, ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE RESULTS 3 (2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/I1-
06_enforcement-stats.pdf.
116. Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 590-91 (2006) ("Researchers note that the auditors
look for unusual, 'suspicious-looking' items that appear to be 'outliers.'" (footnotes omitted)); see
also Robert D. Hershey Jr., A Smarter I.R.S. Learns Your Business, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1994, at
A35 (reporting that IRS auditors typically searched for "red flags, like spikes in income," although
the IRS was making an effort look for patterns instead).
117. Tom Herman, The Next Audit Scare, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2007, at Dl (discussing the
new IRS process for random auditing of the entire taxpayer population); see also Francine Brevetti,
IRS to institute random audit program, OAKLAND TRIB., Aug. 10, 2007, at 1 (Business) (noting the
deterrence effect that random auditing has on taxpayers and stating that "the mere prospect of a
defined audit program makes some taxpayers nervous").
118. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS' USE OF
RANDOM SELECTION IN CHOOSING TAX RETURNS FOR AUDIT (1998), available at http:l
www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98040.pdf (describing the historical and current process of random
selection among certain subpopulations of taxpayers).
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The behavioral findings concerning uncertainty suggest that the IRS can
increase the level of compliance at no additional cost with a slight adjust-
ment of the random auditing process. Under the current practice, individuals
first file their tax return (whether correct or false). Later, the IRS selects a
small number of files for random auditing. The identities of those who will
be randomly audited are determined only after tax returns are filed. Under
the current enforcement mechanism, therefore, taxpayers who consider
committing fraud engage in prediction with regard to the random auditing
process. The IRS, however, could change the filing-auditing sequence. Un-
der such an alternative system, the tax authorities would announce that they
will select in advance the identities of the taxpayers whose files will be ex-
amined in the random auditing process. Here, taxpayers who consider
committing fraud would be engaging in postdiction. The question of
whether they will be audited as part of the random process had been deter-
mined prior to the commission of the offense, so that committing the
offense exposes them to a risk concerning a past event. If individuals are, as
research has demonstrated, particularly averse to postdiction, the alternative
system will have greater deterrent effects than the current system. The per-
ception of potential transgressors that the facts concerning who is going to
be randomly audited have been determined prior to the decision whether to
commit fraud generates greater deterrence than under circumstances in
which the facts concerning who is going to be audited will be determined
after the commission of the offense." 9
Full appraisal of the likelihood of better compliance under the alterna-
tive system requires more experimental and empirical testing. Yet evidence
has shown the applicability of related behavioral findings concerning prob-
abilistic outcomes in the tax-compliance context.' 20 For example, research
119. Probabilistic auditing is not exclusively restricted to the context of tax collection. Due to
budgetary constraints, the strategy of random enforcement is widely applied to areas such as health
care and safety in the workplace. See, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & David Rosenberg, A New Model
of Administrative Enforcement, 93 VA. L. REV. 1983, 2014 (2007) (noting that lessees of federal
lands who are required to pay royalties for oil and gas are subject to probabilistic auditing); Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against
Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 279 (1999) (explaining that the level of audit-
ing and enforcement in federal health care programs is limited and hence only probabilistic); Anne
T. Nichting, OSHA Reform: An Examination of Third Party Audits, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 200
(1999) (noting that there are only 2400 federal and state compliance officers to oversee more than
six million regulated workplaces); Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the
Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 1181, 1214 (1998) ("It is cer-
tainly true that government resources are constrained .... [E]nforcement agencies have never had
sufficient staff to inspect more than a fraction of regulated facilities... "). To this extent, the sug-
gested practice (first choosing the identities of the parties that will be audited and only then
requiring them to provide the information) may serve to decrease the risk of fraud in the various
contexts in which probabilistic auditing is used.
120. As scholars have explained, the large gap between the actual rates of tax compliance and
the compliance rates expected under conventional utility-maximization models indicates that behav-
ioral factors play an important part in parties' decision whether to pay taxes. See, e.g., James Andreoni
et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. EcON. LrrERATURE 818, 855 (1998) (explaining that the "most significant
discrepancy that has been documented between the standard economic model of compliance and real-
world compliance behavior is that the theoretical model greatly overpredicts noncompliance" and argu-
ing that the compliance largely depends on behavioral factors). For a recent overview of the
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has consistently found that taxpayers who expect to get a refund are sub-
stantially more risk averse and avoid cheating when filing their taxes as
compared to individuals who expect to owe money to the IRS. 2' Conse-
quently, it has been recommended that the IRS "increase the amounts that
are withheld from wages and other sources of income, so that more taxpay-
ers can expect a refund."'22 The robust findings concerning prediction and
postdiction suggest another venue for increasing the effectiveness of the tax
system, one that requires a smaller modification of the current tax-collection
practice.22 Given the magnitude of the tax evasion problem, even a small
shift in deterrence could result in a significant increase in amounts collected
by the IRS.
The observed behavioral differences with regard to past and future un-
certainty may also affect the current debates concerning various
controversial law-enforcement policies. Law-enforcement mechanisms that
require criminals to postdict-such as the installation of hidden cameras in
public places-are typically more intrusive than those that require criminals
to predict; the former type of law-enforcement mechanisms often involves
monitoring individuals prior to the commission of an offense and intruding
into their lives. In deciding the constitutionality of intrusive law-enforcement
mechanisms, courts often inquire whether other means of law-enforcement
are possible. 24 For example, while police may increase the number of patrols
psychological literature on tax compliance, see ERICH KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF
TAX BEHAVIOUR (2007). See also Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1961 (1994) (discussing the contributions of cognitive theory in understanding tax compli-
ance).
121. See, e.g., Otto H Chang et al., Taxpayer Attitudes Toward Tax Audit Risk, 8 J. EcON.
PSYCHOL. 299, 301-07 (1987) (conducting an experiment with MBA students that were randomly
assigned to either gain (refund) or loss (payment) conditions and finding that the first were substan-
tially less inclined to cheat); Henry S.J. Robben et al., Decision Frame and Opportunity as
Determinants of Tax Cheating: An international experimental study, 11 J. EcON. PSYCHOL. 341
(1990) (presenting both experimental and empirical evidence for greater tax compliance among
taxpayers entitled to a refund as compared to taxpayers who expect to owe money to the IRS and
arguing that behavioral theories can account for these results); see also Guthrie, Prospect Theory,
supra note 8, at 1143-45 (discussing additional studies exploring the application of prospect theory
in the context of tax compliance).
122. Elizabeth F. Loftus, To File, Perchance To Cheat, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Apr. 1985, at 38.
123. Scholars have also expressed doubts about the effectiveness of ideas to use the findings
of prospect theory (that is, to increase the number of taxpayers who are entitled to refund) to pro-
mote compliance. John S. Carroll, Compliance with the Law: A Decision-Making Approach to
Taxpaying, II L. & HUM. BEHAv. 319, 327 (1987) ("[Tihere are other ways to frame this situation
that makes this policy recommendation more risky, such as framing each withholding as a loss, or
comparing oneself to other people who may pay less taxes."). The idea of switching the sequence of
filing and auditing is not susceptible to such concerns.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Ashley, 876 F.2d 1069, 1072 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Prior to granting
authorization for a wiretap, the issuing court 'must satisfy itself that the government has used nor-
mal techniques but it has encountered difficulties in penetrating a criminal enterprise or in gathering
evidence--to the point where ... wiretapping becomes reasonable.'" (quoting United States v.
Abou-Saada, 785 F.2d I, 11 (1st Cir. 1986))).
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in vulnerable places, courts tend to invalidate the use of hidden cameras as a
method for achieving greater deterrence.'2
The behavioral findings, however, suggest that the two alternatives pre-
sent different types of law-enforcement strategies. The possible monitoring
by video cameras involves postdiction, and such law-enforcement mecha-
nisms are likely to be more effective than the ones requiring prediction. The
greater effectiveness of the former does not dictate that they ought to be pre-
ferred over other less intrusive types of law-enforcement mechanisms, but it
suggests that the reluctance to use them has greater costs than policymakers
traditionally appreciate.
Because the risk of apprehension is almost always less than 100%, stud-
ies concerning the effects of uncertainty have important implications with
regard to the design of law-enforcement policies. The next Section shows
that these studies are also relevant to the design of legal sanctions. Although
conventionally perceived as predictable, legal sanctions in practice are often
uncertain and may depend on both past and future contingencies. The be-
havioral findings suggest that the actual type of uncertainty (past or future)
created by different sanctions is likely to have diverse effects on the incen-
tives of potential offenders.
C. Legal Uncertainty and the Deterrent Effect of Legal Sanctions
Criminal law theory often emphasizes the importance of certainty and
predictability. 26 Consideration of moral accountability and "fair warning," it
is argued, dictate that the legal system inform potential transgressors of the!. 127
penalties they would suffer in case of noncompliance. In reality, however,
the severity of the sanction following the perpetration of an offense is rarely
known to the potential perpetrator of a crime with certainty. Criminals
125. See, e.g., Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 262--64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
In addressing a rise in violent gang crimes, the City of Garden Grove enacted an ordinance to regu-
late the operation of cyber cafes. Among other provisions, the city required the installation of closed
circuit cameras. In his dissent, Judge Sills argued that such cameras violate costumer privacy and
are unnecessary for the purpose of deterring crime because "[t]here are any number of substantial
means by which the city's interest in protecting against gang violence could be realized without
video surveillance. Police patrols could be increased." Id. at 279 (Sills, J., dissenting).
126. Section 1.02 of the Model Penal Code, which is devoted to specifying the Code's pur-
poses, states in subsection 1.02(2)(d) that one of the Code's objectives is "to give fair warning of the
nature of the sentences that may be imposed on conviction of an offense." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.02(2)(d) (1962). Fair warning requirements with respect to the sentences are entrenched in nu-
merous criminal codes. For a list of jurisdictions explicitly requiring fair warning with respect to the
size of the criminal sanctions, see I Am. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES:
PART I, GENERAL PROVISIONS § 1.02 cmt. 3(d) n.38, at 27 (1985).
127. For a discussion of these concems from the perspective of the principle of legality, see I
AM. LAW INST., supra note 126, § 1.02 cmt. 2(d); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING




typically must make conjectures concerning the expected size of a sanction
under conditions of uncertainty. 
28
A number of factors make the size of legal sanctions unpredictable.
Most importantly, several of these factors depend on the existence of various
circumstances prior to the time that an offense is committed. Others depend
on the materialization of contingencies that take place only subsequent to
the behavior that constitutes the offense. "Sanctions uncertainty" may thus
involve past uncertainty, future uncertainty, or a combination of the two.
From the perspective of potential transgressors, any attempt to evaluate the
expected severity of criminal sanctions demands predictions as well as post-
dictions.
Consider initially how future contingencies may affect the size of sanc-
tions inflicted for wrongdoing. Many legal systems treat complete crimes
and unsuccessful attempts differently. 29 The accomplishment or failure of
crimes is often a matter of future uncertainty-the criminals' uncertainty
with respect to the eventual realization of the criminals' own goals. Even
with respect to complete crimes, the perpetration of a crime may lead to
more- or less-serious harms. Harsher sanctions often follow graver harms,
such as serious injuries.'30 For example, the distinction between "bodily in-
jury" and "serious bodily injury" is the basis for differentiating between
simple assault and aggravated assault. 3 ' These different offenses carry dif-
ferent sentences. Yet the perpetrator often may not know at the time of the
crime whether his assault will result in bodily injury or serious bodily
128. See 1 AM. LAW INST., supra note 126, § 1.02 cmt. 2(d), at 19 ("The clarity that is attain-
able is often limited ... by the complexity of the conflicting elements .... "). As Justice Holmes
once observed, "[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly,
that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it .... If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a
fine or a short imprisonment... he may incur the penalty of death." Nash v. United States, 229 U.S.
373, 377 (1913).
129. The majority of states punish inchoate crimes less severely than completed crimes. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 1999) (establishing that the maximum term for an attempt is no
more than one half of the maximum term authorized for the completed offense); N.Y PENAL LAW
§ 110.05 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2008) (establishing that punishment for an attempt is typically
one classification below that of the completed crime). However, a substantial minority of states have
followed Section 5.05(1) of the Model Penal Code and made the punishment for attempt nearly
equal to that of the completed crime. See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 545 (8th ed. 2007). Among the state code provisions that follow the Model Penal Code
are 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-4 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-51 (West 2007); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (2007); and 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 1998).
130. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991) ("[Tlhe assessment of harm caused by the
defendant as a result of the crime charged has understandably been an important concern of the
criminal law, both in determining the elements of the offense and in determining the appropriate
punishment."). See generally Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 Nw. U.
L. REv. 857 (1994) (reviewing the correlation between victims' harms and the severity of criminal
sanctions).
131. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)-(2) (1962) (defining simple and aggravated as-
sault). For a general overview, see Tracy A. Batemen, Annotation, Sufficiency of bodily injury to
support charge of aggravated assault, 5 A.L.R.5th 243 (1992) (discussing the boundaries between
simple and aggravated assault).
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injury. 2 Last, the discretionary powers granted to judges in some jurisdic-
tions involve future uncertainty with respect to the size of the sanction. The
severity of the actual punishment depends on the future exercise of discre-
tion by the decision maker.'33
Other elements that affect the size of sanctions are contingent on the ex-
istence of facts prior to the time that criminal behavior is carried out. To be
sure, because of the general mens rea requirement in criminal law-the re-
quirement that the transgressor be morally blameworthy-a defendant must
usually know the circumstances under which his act is performed. Even so,
the actual application of mens rea allows for past uncertainty.34 First, as
courts have decided in a line of cases, many circumstances that affect the
size of a sentence are not considered essential elements of the offense. Con-
sequently, the prosecution need not establish that the perpetrator knew of
these circumstances."' To this extent, a criminal who is uncertain of the ex-
istence of aggravating factors during the commission of the crime may
nevertheless be convicted of the aggravated crime.1 6 Second, even when
such circumstances are essential elements of the offense, criminal law often
only requires proving that the defendant knew of their possible existence.
3 7
The requirement of mens rea thus does not presuppose certainty concerning
existing circumstances, but only understanding of the possibility that the
relevant circumstances may apply.'38 As such, criminals may often face the
132. See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, "Eggshell" Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal
Benefits of Shifting Crime, 105 MIcH. L. REV. 307, 326-28 (2006) (examining across various juris-
dictions the mens rea necessary for conviction in aggravated assault and indicating that it usually
requires only that a risk of serious bodily injury was foreseeable).
133. One of the official aims of the Sentencing Guidelines was to eliminate or at least reduce
the disparity in sentencing resulting from judicial discretion. Nevertheless, recent studies have estab-
lished that despite this effort, great disparities still exist. See, e.g., Kirby D. Behre & A. Jeff Ifrah,
Foreword: You Be the Judge: The Success of Fifteen Years of Sentencing Under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 5, 7 (2003); see also David B. Mustard, Racial, Eth-
nic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & EcoN.
285 (2001) (presenting data showing substantial sentencing disparities).
134. For a general discussion of mens rea, see DRESSLER, supra note 127, at 125-53.
135. In an effective critique of the deterioration of the mens rea requirement, Richard Singer
recently demonstrated the techniques that allow conviction in circumstances under which the perpe-
trator was unaware of some of the surrounding relevant circumstances. Under the first technique,
courts determine that these (unknown) circumstances are not an element of the crime at all but a
sentencing factor. Under the second, courts determine that the relevant circumstances create only a
"jurisdictional element" of an offense. By employing such classifications, courts in effect allow
conviction despite the fact that the perpetrator was not aware of some of the surrounding circum-
stances, such as the nature of smuggled drugs or the dollar amount of stolen property. Richard
Singer, The Model Penal Code and Three Two (Possibly Only One) Ways Courts Avoid Mens Rea, 4
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139 (2000).
136. See infra text accompanying notes 144-147.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 145-147.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 145-147 (addressing in particular the definition of
recklessness in section 2.02(2)(c) of the MPG); see also KADISH ET AL., supra note 129, at 225
(explaining that the common law default-culpability standard requires awareness of the possible
existence of the relevant circumstances or results).
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need to postdict the existence of contingencies that would affect the magni-
tude of possible sanctions.
The context of property offenses (such as robbery, theft, or fraud) illus-
trates how existing factors unknown to the offender at the time of the crime
may affect the severity of sanctions. In many jurisdictions, the sentences for
property offenses vary incrementally with the dollar amount involved in the
offense. 3 9 Furthermore, the very classification of the offense may change
when the amount changes. For example, the distinction between felonious
theft and petty theft often depends on the value of the object stolen.' 4° Where
a perpetrator snatches a purse and finds-much to his surprise-that it con-
tains $100,000, rather than small bills he expected, he may be convicted of
felonious theft even though he never intended to commit such an offense. 141
Given that the expected sentence varies with the amount of money stolen,
the criminal faces the task of postdicting the sanction; while unknown to the
criminal, the factors on which the sanction depends already exist when the
offense is committed.
The sentencing of property offenses represents a more general rule con-
cerning the limited scope of the mens rea requirement. An offender can be
convicted of a more serious offense even if the circumstances responsible
for its greater severity are unknown to the offender. The decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Feola demonstrates a similar
principle that generates uncertainty resulting from jurisdictional concerns.1
42
In convicting the accused of assaulting a federal officer (which is what
brings the charge into federal, rather than state, court) the Court asserted:
[I]n order to effectuate the congressional purpose of according maximum
protection to federal officers by making prosecution for assaults upon them
cognizable in the federal courts, § 111 cannot be construed as embodying
an unexpressed requirement that an assailant be aware that his victim is a
139. 2 AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES: PART II, DEFINITION OF
SPECIFIC CRIMES, § 223.1 cmt. 3, at 138 (1985) ("[M]ost jurisdictions classify thefts according to
the monetary value of the property stolen.").
140. The distinction between different types of larceny based on the value of the stolen ob-
jects are characteristic of many criminal codes, although the terms used to describe the different
larceny offences change. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.25-155.42 (McKinney 1999 & Supp.
2008) (creating crimes of petit larceny and four degrees of grand larceny, depending, inter alia, on
the value of the property stolen).
141. DRESSLER, supra note 127, at 593 n.10 (pointing out that the common law distinguished
between grand and petit larceny on the basis of the amount taken by the thief). For a discussion of
this practice, see Mikos, supra note 132, at 330-32. See also 2 Am. LAW INST., supra note 139,
§ 223.1 cmt. 3(c), at 146 (arguing that under the traditional view of common law, "the defendant
would be held .. . to take the jewels as he found them and thus to be guilty of felony theft even
though he held the non-reckless belief that the jewels were worth only $100"). The Model Penal
Code, however, recommends regarding the amount stolen as a material element of the offense and
therefore requires proof that the thief at least considered the possibility that the sum stolen is higher
than the threshold for grand or otherwise aggravated theft. Id. § 223.1 cmt. 3(c), at 144.




federal officer. All the statute requires is an intent to assault, not an intent
to assault a federal officer.
43
The jurisdictional decision in this case is not a technical matter; it has a large
effect on the size of the sanction. An offender may often face past uncertainty
(here, for example, uncertainty as to whether he is assaulting a federal officer
and is subject therefore to federal jurisdiction). In anticipating his expected
sanction, an offender is required to guess whether or not the circumstances
which are required for conviction in a federal offence exist in his case.' "
But even with respect to essential elements of offenses, where the de-
mand of mens rea applies, offenders may be involved in postdiction. As
noted, criminal conviction usually does not dictate that a defendant be cer-
tain of the relevant facts. In some contexts, conviction merely requires that
the perpetrator know of the possibility that the essential facts constituting
the offense exist. For example, the Model Penal Code ("MPC") provides
that "[w]hen the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an
offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts
purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.' 45 The concept of
recklessness is specifically designed to facilitate the conviction of a person
under conditions of uncertainty. Section 2.02(2)(c) of the MPC dictates that
"[a] person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct." 146 Thus, a person
who is uncertain about his partner's consent to sexual intercourse could be
convicted of rape if it turns out there was no consent. 47 From the perspective
143. Feola, 420 U.S. at 684.
144. Commentators have suggested that several decisions of the Supreme Court might indi-
cate a potential shift in the scope of the mens rea requirement. Under the rules of evidence and
procedure, material elements of the offense-as opposed to sentencing factors-must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt and be decided by juries rather than by a judge. See Singer, supra note
135, at 174-75. In recent years, the Court has stiffened the evidential and procedural requirements
and extended the scope of what constitutes material elements for these purposes. Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004)
(extending Apprendi and arguing that the "statutory maximum" in Apprendi was "the maximum
sentence a judge may impose ... without any additional findings"); United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005) (extending the previous decisions to cover sentencing based on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines). Scholars have argued that this trend might eventually also affect the
definition of "material elements" in the context of mens rea. See Singer, supra note 135, at 174-76.
To this extent, if the Court applies the requirement with respect to factors that determine the size of
the sanction, potential offenders will face less past uncertainty. As our analysis suggests, such a
change is likely to decrease deterrence.
145. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1962) (emphasis added). The general framework of the
mens rea requirement of the MPC "has been adopted explicitly in more than half of American juris-
dictions." KADISH ET AL., supra note 129, at 222.
146. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (emphasis added).
147. The commentaries to the Model Penal Code clarify this point, explaining that "[a]s the
Code uses the term, recklessness involves conscious risk creation. It resembles acting knowingly in
that a state of awareness is involved, but the awareness is of risk, that is of a probability less than
substantial certainty... " 1 AM. LAW INST., supra note 126, § 2.02, at 236.
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of the perpetrator, the decision whether or not to engage in sexual inter-
course involves postdiction concerning the existence of consent. The more
criminal law allows convictions on the basis of recklessness, the more indi-
viduals are likely to confront past uncertainties.
Against this background, legal analysis and policy discussions have re-
cently paid increasing attention to the effects of sanction uncertainty on
individuals' willingness to engage in criminal conduct. 48 Legal scholars and
policymakers have suggested that sanction uncertainty can be harnessed to
augment the deterrent effect of the criminal system. 49 While designing
mechanisms to create uncertainty, however, they have focused almost exclu-
sively on the creation of future uncertainty.'5° Overlooking the greater
deterrent effects of past uncertainty, these proposals fail to fully exploit the
incentives that uncertainty may provide for discouraging criminal behavior.
In a recent article, for example, Professor Katyal has written in favor of
the (much-criticized) "Pinkerton rule"' 5'-which renders criminals liable for
the crimes of their co-conspirators-because "people are less likely to know
the extent of their liability under Pinkerton."'' 2 As Katyal argues, this uncer-
tainty "will deter some from joining the conspiracy, and it will also make
the contract for payment tougher to strike."'53 While acknowledging that the
rule may be challenged on fairness grounds, Katyal highlights the positive
deterrent effects it produces given the uncertainty it creates among members
of a potential conspiracy who scheme to perpetrate a crime. '14 The deter-




148. See, e.g., Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Ap-
proach, 89 IowA L. REV. 443 (2004); Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law
and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, I AM. L. &
EcoN. REV. 276 (1999).
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155. Id. For a similar recent approach concerning the possible advantages of uncertainty in
enhancing deterrence, see Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 1535, 1545-47 (2005). Stevenson noted:
Instead of eliminating the deterrent effect of laws, as the classic law and economics writers have
assumed, uncertainty functions as a deterrent on its own.... The "information gap" created by
widespread ignorance of the law, which is an inevitable and natural result of laws ... is not neces-
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In another recent article, Professor Baker and his colleagues examined
the effects of uncertainty in experimental settings. 56 Participants decided
whether to take an action that would result in a monetary payoff but would
expose them to a risk of being caught and required to pay a fine.' In the
experiment, the authors varied the certainty of the information provided to
the participants about the size of the fine and the chances of being caught
while holding constant the expected value of the sanction and the average
probability of being caught.' The results show that "uncertainty with regard
to either the size of a sanction or the probability of detection increases deter-
rence."'59 Thus, participants were less likely to take the action when told that
the sanction would be in an amount between $1 and $5 than when told that
it would be in the range of $2 to $4 or a certain sanction of $3.'6 Based on
these findings, Baker and his colleagues have argued that broad sentencing
discretion regimes that generate uncertainty about the size of criminal sanc-
tions are desirable because they provide greater deterrence than regimes in
which criminal sentences are predetermined and predictable. 161
Policymakers have explicitly approved sentencing strategies that gener-
ate uncertainty for the sake of augmenting deterrence. In recent years,
increasing federal criminal legislation has made a wide range of offenses
subject to concurrent jurisdiction (federal and state), with the severity of the
federal sentence usually exceeding the severity of the sentence imposed by
state law. 162 When Rudolph Giuliani was the U.S. Attorney in New York, he
"initiated 'federal day,' one day chosen at random each week in which all
street-level drug dealers apprehended by local authorities would be prose-
cuted in federal court. Giuliani stated that '[t]he idea was to create a
Russian-roulette effect.' ,,163 In his later political campaigns, Giuliani often
156. See Baker et al., supra note 148.
157. Id. at 457.
158. Id. at 458.
159. Id. at 464.
160. Id. at 461-64.
161. See id. at 471-72. Arguably, these results seem to conflict with prospect theory, which
predicts that individuals will be risk loving with respect to losses. Baker and his colleagues suggest
that a possible explanation might be the way in which the participants (and criminals in the real
world) frame the payoff scheme that involves a certain gain and risk for loss:
It appears that the participants did not evaluate the sanction in isolation, but rather in conjunc-
tion with the benefit derived from making the risky choice.... In this way, the participants
appear to have framed [the payoff scheme] as presenting the possibility of a gain, with the re-
sulting risk averse behavior that prospect theory predicts with regard to gains.
Id. at 466.
162. See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGs L.J. 979, 997 (1995) (noting that individuals
indicted in federal courts are usually "subjected to much harsher sentences").
163. Id. at 1000 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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referred to this "sentencing lottery," arguing that it kept drug dealers off bal-
164
ance.
The preceding analysis, however, suggests that these practices might not
be the most effective strategies to employ uncertainty for enhancing the de-
terrent effect of criminal sanctions. The Pinkerton rule, broad-discretion
sentencing regimes, and Giuliani's lottery system all similarly generate fu-
ture uncertainty. From the potential perpetrator's perspective, each of these
practices requires her to predict the outcomes of contingencies that will be
resolved subsequent to her decision whether or not to commit the crime.
Given the behavioral findings concerning uncertainty, the legal system could
achieve greater deterrence where potential perpetrators would be required to
postdict-for example the existence of aggravating factors-in gauging
their expected sanction.
Determining the desirable level of sanction uncertainty requires the bal-
ancing of competing interests, such as fair-warning principles and efficient
deterrence. But any such determination should be sensitive to the type of
uncertainty it creates. If the design of criminal sanctions is such that it in-
volves mostly postdiction, it is likely to generate greater deterrence than a
similar system that mostly involves prediction. Lawmakers who wish to de-
crease uncertainty (to provide fairer warning) while keeping deterrence
constant can thus substitute legal practices that include substantial future
uncertainty with practices that include only a limited level of past uncer-
tainty.
CONCLUSION
Behavioral studies establish that individuals who are required to guess
the results of future events act differently than individuals who are required
to guess the results of past events. Although from the standpoint of probabil-
ity theory the source of uncertainty should have no effect, individuals
manifest a consistent preference for future guesses over past guesses. Indi-
viduals who predict are more optimistic, confident, and risk taking than
individuals who postdict.
The preceding analysis shows that legislators, law-enforcement authori-
ties, and judges can often choose the nature of legal uncertainties. Most
importantly, their decisions regarding the specificity of norms, law-
enforcement strategies, and the parameters that set sanction severity deter-
164. See William Glaberson, Giuliani's Powerful Image Under Campaign Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 1989, at Al. For a proposal similar to Giuliani's in the context of corporate law, see
Ashwini Jayaratnam, Prosecuting Stock-Option Backdating: The Ethics of Enforcement Techniques,
20 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 755, 763-64 (2007). Jayaratnam noted:
Another method of achieving optimal deterrence ... is for prosecutors to randomly select a
specified number of companies to prosecute. This would be akin to a lottery where the compa-
nies chosen for prosecution are essentially picked out of a hat, or chosen on some other
random basis.... [T]he arbitrariness of a lottery is likely to keep companies on their toes when
it comes to issues like option backdating ....
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mine whether legal contingencies would be placed in the future or in the
past. The different effects of past and future uncertainty on behavior thus
suggest that the legal system can influence choices not only by providing
positive and negative payoffs in the form of formal penalties and subsidies;
it may also inhibit and encourage behavior by manipulating the nature of
law-related uncertainties. Furthermore, the prevalence of uncertainty across
different legal contexts allows policymakers to select from a spectrum of
possibilities and combinations. Policymakers may regulate an activity in a
way that involves future, past, or some combination of past and future con-
tingencies. This rich set of alternatives shows the potential wide-range
implications of prediction-postdiction findings in the context of legal regula-
tion.
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